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A railroad company can discharge an employee who swore at his supervisor after he was denied FMLA leave.
A railroad company did not violate the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by firing a conductor for his inappropriate response when his supervisor denied the employee's request for medical leave.
In 1998, the railroad approved the plaintiff's request for intermittent medical leave because of his back and shoulder problems. On July 4, 1999, the plaintiff requested the day off, because he woke up with severe back pain. His supervisor denied the leave, because the plaintiff was only authorized to take leave to see a chiropractor. Angry over the decision, the employee swore at his supervisor and asked if they should "take it outside" to resolve their dispute. After the verbal altercation, the plaintiff went home. The supervisor received approval to terminate the plaintiff that same day.
The plaintiff argued that his termination was in retaliation for seeking FMLA leave. The court dismissed the claim, explaining that even if the plaintiff should have been given leave on July 4, the employer was still allowed to fire him for the way he responded to his supervisor. Insubordination and fighting words are not protected by the FMLA. Thus, the railroad was not prohibited from firing the plaintiff.
This case demonstrates that employees are not permitted to act in an outrageous manner, even if the employee thinks he has been deprived of a statutory right. In such cases, employers are allowed to terminate employees for their acts of insubordination.
-- Elaine S. Fox, Labor and Employment attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, with assistance from Melanie H. Berkowitz, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
[For more information, see Denny vs. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5993 (3d Cir. March 9, 2006)].
An employer is allowed to sue a former employee who deleted data on a company computer just before quitting.
A company that sued a former employee under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) can continue with its claim against the employee for deleting all of the data on a company-issued laptop.
After deleting the data, the employee installed a secure-erasure program to guarantee the company could not find the files. The deleted data included information collected by the plaintiff as part of his job, as well as information that could have revealed that the employee engaged in improper conduct before he quit.
The employee argued that the CFAA, an anti-hacking law, did not apply, because the employee did not transmit any information but instead hit the delete button. The court rejected this argument, specifically noting that in this case, the installation of the secure-erasure program constituted a "transmission" from a floppy disk or CD to the computer. That is, the law protects against more than transmissions to and from the Internet or another computer. The court did not decide whether simply hitting the delete button, without more, would have violated the law as well.
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that his employment contract allowed him to delete the data on the laptop computer. The contract specifically authorized the employee to delete files. However, the employee lost his authority to access the laptop when he breached his duty of loyalty to the employer by engaging in misconduct and deciding to quit in violation of his employment contract.
This case demonstrates that the CFAA can be used to protect employers who are harmed when workers intentionally damage company data.
-- Elaine S. Fox, Labor and Employment attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, with assistance from Melanie H. Berkowitz, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
[For more information, see Int'l Airport Centers vs. Citrin, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5772 (7th Cir. March 8, 2006)].
An employer may have to accommodate the religious beliefs of a worker who serves as a preacher on Sundays.
The plaintiff in this case was a man who worked as a mill worker and a preacher. When the employee became a preacher, he arranged to swap shifts with another mill employee so that he would not have to work on Sundays. That person retired in 2002, and the plaintiff could not find anyone else to swap shifts with him. The plaintiff informed the employer of his conflict and said that Sunday is his Sabbath. When no substitute employee was found, the plaintiff refused to work Sundays and began accumulating attendance penalty points. The plaintiff sued, claiming that his employer discriminated against his religious beliefs by not allowing him to take Sundays off.
The court first refused to dismiss the company's claim that the employee's religious belief was not truly held, explaining that only a jury could assess the credibility of the plaintiff's beliefs.
The company also asserted that the shift-swapping arrangement was a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff's religious beliefs. The court found, however, that the employer could not rely solely on the shift-swapping policy when the plaintiff made it clear to management that there was still a conflict with his religious beliefs. The company would only be entitled to have the case dismissed if accommodating the plaintiff's beliefs would be an excessive burden on the company's operations or if it would impose an excessive cost on the company.
This case shows that employers should be cautious about deciding whether an employee's religious beliefs are truly held and thus deserving of accommodation. This is usually a question for a jury.
-- Elaine S. Fox, Labor and Employment attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, with assistance from Melanie H. Berkowitz, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
[For more information, see Kenner vs. Domtar Indus. Inc., No. 04-CV-4021 (W.D. Ark., March 3 2006)].
An employee who is sensitive to the odor of her coworkers' perfume and other chemicals is not considered disabled under the ADA.
A federal court ruled that an administrative employee for the Indiana Civil Rights Commission is not considered disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act despite her sensitivity to the chemicals used in office documents and the perfume worn by her coworkers.
The employee suffered from breathing difficulties triggered by exposure to certain environmental chemicals. When the employee told the commission about her problem, the commission relocated her to an enclosed workspace with a high-efficiency air filtration system. The commission also limited, but did not eliminate, the employee's exposure to certain office brochures containing chemicals that aggravated her condition.
The court noted that the plaintiff's condition caused difficulty breathing, nosebleeds, dizziness and swelling. However, because the plaintiff was not afflicted with adverse reactions while at home, the chemical sensitivities were not severe enough to constitute a disability under the ADA. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff were considered disabled under the ADA, the employer would not be required to accommodate her disability by allowing her to work from home.
For a contrary holding in a case with similar facts, see Heaser vs. The Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2000) (employee with a chemical sensitivity was disabled but could not perform her job, even with a reasonable accommodation).
These cases show that determining if an employee is disabled and entitled to accommodations is a fact-intensive inquiry. Employers should not deny accommodations to an employee without first consulting an employment attorney.
-- Elaine S. Fox, Labor and Employment attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, with assistance from Melanie H. Berkowitz, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
[For more information, see Jones vs. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 1:02-cv-01701 (S.D. Ind. March 17, 2006)].
An employer did not violate the ADEA by terminating an employee on the day she gave notice.
An employer did not unlawfully discriminate against an employee on the basis of age when it terminated her employment on the date she gave notice, rather than on the date she requested.
The employee had been warned twice about unacceptable behavior toward other team members. After one such warning, the plaintiff assumed she had been fired and told a human resources employee that she would drop off her computer and identification badge the following Monday. She returned to work on Sunday, but the guards would not let her enter the building, so she left her badge and computer at the security desk. The plaintiff did not return to work, and several days later, the employer asked the plaintiff for a resignation letter. The plaintiff agreed but asked if the resignation could be effective six weeks later -- allowing her pension benefits to vest. Initially, the company agreed. Management later decided, however, to accept the resignation on the date the letter was submitted. The plaintiff claimed that the decision to accept the resignation letter on the date it was submitted was motivated by unlawful age bias.
The court disagreed, explaining that there is a distinct difference between age and years of service. The vesting of the plaintiff's pension benefits depended upon her years of service, not age, and therefore did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Furthermore, the decision to accept an employee's resignation is not an adverse employment action. Finally, the plaintiff could not demonstrate any cases where a similarly situated younger worker was treated more favorably than she was. Thus, her age discrimination claim was dismissed by the court.
This case demonstrates that employment decisions made on the basis of years of service will usually not constitute age discrimination.
-- Elaine S. Fox, Labor and Employment attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, with assistance from Melanie H. Berkowitz, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
[For more information, see Leyva vs. Computer Scis. Corp., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5796 (3rd Cir. March 7, 2006)].
